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The malware analysis and detection research community relies on the online platform VirusTotal to
label Android apps based on the scan results of around 60 antiviral scanners. Unfortunately, there
are no standards on how to best interpret the scan results acquired from VirusTotal, which leads
to the utilization of different threshold-based labeling strategies (e.g., if ten or more scanners deem
an app malicious, it is considered malicious). While some of the utilized thresholds may be able to
accurately approximate the ground truths of apps, the fact that VirusTotal changes the set and
versions of the scanners it uses makes such thresholds unsustainable over time. We implemented
a method, Maat, that tackles these issues of standardization and sustainability by automatically
generating an Machine Learning (ML)-based labeling scheme, which outperforms threshold-based
labeling strategies. Using the VirusTotal scan reports of 53K Android apps that span one year, we
evaluated the applicability of Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies by comparing their performance
against threshold-based strategies. We found that such ML-based strategies (a) can accurately
and consistently label apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports, and (b) contribute to training
ML-based detection methods that are more effective at classifying out-of-sample apps than their
threshold-based counterparts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A fundamental step in the process of implementing and evaluating novel malware detection
methods is the creation of ground truths for the malicious and benign applications (hereafter
apps) used to train those methods by accurately labeling them as malicious and benign.
Inaccurate labels might impact the reliability of studies that inspect trends adopted by
malicious apps, and, more importantly, might impede the development of effective detection
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methods [10, 11, 15, 23]. Manual analysis and labeling of apps cannot cope with the
frequent release of malware. Moreover, some detection methods (e.g., machine-learning-based
methods), require large numbers of data for training, which renders manual analysis and
labeling infeasible. Consequently, researchers turn to online platforms, such as VirusTotal
[44], that provide scan results from different commercial antiviral software [17, 42, 45, 47, 49].
The platform, VirusTotal, does not label apps as malicious and benign. Given a hash
of an app or its executable, the platform returns the labels given by around 60 antiviral
scanners to the app along with information about its content and runtime behavior. It is up
to the platform’s user to decide upon strategies to interpret such information to label apps
as malicious and benign. Unfortunately, there are no standard procedures for interpreting the
scan results acquired from VirusTotal to label apps. Researchers hence use their intuitions
and adopt ad hoc threshold-based strategies to label the apps in the datasets used to train
and evaluate their detection methods or release to the research community as benchmarks.
In essence, threshold-based labeling strategies deem an app as malicious if the number of
antiviral scanners labeling the apps as malicious meets a certain threshold. For example,
based on VirusTotal’s scan reports, Li et al. labeled the apps in their Piggybacking dataset
as malicious if at least one scanner labeled them as malicious [17]. Pendlebury et al. labeled
an app as malicious if four or more scanners did so, and based the evaluation of their tool
on such threshold [8]. Wei et al. labeled apps in the AMD dataset as malicious if 50% or
more of the total scanners labeled an app as such [47]. Finally, the authors of the Drebin
dataset [4] labeled an app as malicious if at least two out of ten scanners they manually
selected courtesy of their reputation (e.g., AVG, BitDefender, Kaspersky, McAfee) did so.
Some of the aforementioned labeling strategies may indeed accurately label apps better
than others. However, researchers have found VirusTotal to frequently change (e.g., by
manipulating the scanners it uses in its scan reports) [23, 24, 28]. Changing the (number of)
scanners in the scan reports affects labeling strategies that deem apps as malicious based
on a fixed number of VirusTotal scanners that label apps as such, namely threshold-based
labeling strategies, as follows. Threshold values that used to yield the most accurate labels
might change in the future as VirusTotal changes the scanners it includes in its scan
reports. In other words, VirusTotal’s dynamicity renders fixed threshold-based labeling
strategies not sustainable. To cope with the dynamicity of VirusTotal, researchers have to
manually analyze VirusTotal scan reports to identify the current optimal thresholds to use
in labeling the apps they use in their experiments. In addition to infeasibility, this analysis
process is subjective and not systematic as researchers are expected to adopt different
approaches to analyzing VirusTotal scan reports to find the current optimal thresholds.
Using out-of-date or inaccurate thresholds alters the distribution of malicious and benign
apps in the same dataset, effectively yielding different datasets and, in turn, different
detection results as revealed by recent results [8, 31]. On the one hand, researchers might
dismiss promising detection approaches, because they underperform on a dataset that utilizes
a labeling strategy that does not reflect the true nature of the apps in the dataset. On the
other hand, developers of inadequate detection methods might get a false sense of confidence
in the detection capabilities of their detection methods because they perform well, albeit
using an inaccurate labeling strategy [27, 32].
Until a more stable alternative to VirusTotal is introduced, the research community will
continue to use VirusTotal to label apps using subjective thresholds. So, the overarching
objective of this paper is to provide the research community with actionable insights about
VirusTotal, the aspects of its dynamicity, its limitations, and how to optimally interpret its
scan reports to label Android apps accurately. As part of this objective, we demonstrate how
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3threshold-based labeling strategies can be used to label Android apps. However, through our
measurements and experiments, we strengthen existing evidence that this breed of labeling
strategies is subjective, not sustainable, and requires regular analysis of VirusTotal in order
to be effectively used to label apps. To address the limitations of threshold-based labeling
strategies, we suggest an automated and systematic procedure to infer the adequate labeling
strategy using our framework, Maat1. Maat automatically analyzes a set of VirusTotal
scan reports of pre-labeled apps to identify the set of (likely) correct and stable VirusTotal
scanners at a given point in time. Maat then uses ML to build labeling strategies based on
this and further information. Maat defines our technical contribution. Our methodological
contribution then is a direct consequence: Whenever a new detection method is to be
trained or evaluated, we suggest to apply Maat to the most recent VirusTotal scan reports,
hence build the currently best labeling strategy, and use this strategy to (re-)label existing
collections of apps. However, unlike threshold-based labeling strategies, our experiments
show that Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies can withstand VirusTotal’s dynamicity for
longer periods of time and, hence, need to be re-trained on a regular basis.
The contributions of this paper, therefore, are:
• Implementing and publicly releasing the code of Maat (Section 4): a framework that
provides the research community with a systematic method to generate ML-based
labeling strategies on-demand based on the current scan results provided by VirusTotal.
The results of our experiments show that Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies are less
sensitive to the dynamicity of VirusTotal, which enabled them to (a) accurately label
apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports more consistently than their threshold-
based counterparts and (b) improve the detection capabilities of ML-based detection
methods (Section 5).
• Through the measurements and experiments conducted in this paper, we found four
main limitations of VirusTotal that sometimes undermine its reliability and usefulness.
Those limitations are (a) refraining from frequently reanalyzing and re-scanning apps,
(b) changing the set of scanners used to scan the same apps on frequent basis, (c) using
inadequate versions of scanners that are designed to detect malicious apps for other
platforms, and (d) denying access to the history of scan reports (Section 6).
• Unlike previous research efforts that are in pursuit of identifying a universal set of
VirusTotal scanners that are more correct that authors, in Section 4.2, we demonstrate
that there is no universal set of scanners that can always accurately label apps in
any dataset and at any time period. In fact those two factors significantly alters the
correct set of scanners based on Mohaisen et al.’s correctness score [24]. However,
using Maat, researchers can automate the process of identifying the current set of
VirusTotal scanners that can accurately label apps within a given time period and, in
turn, help train reliable ML-based labeling strategies.
2 DATASETS
In this section, we briefly discuss the composition and the role of the datasets we used in
motivating the need for Maat and for conducting experiments to evaluate it. Table 1 shows
the datasets we use in this paper.
1Maat refers to the ancient Egyptian concepts of truth, balance, harmony, and justice. Our framework builds
ML-based labeling strategies that harmonize the labels given by different VirusTotal scanners to provide
accurate and reliable labels to apps.
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Table 1. A summary of the datasets we utilize in this paper, their composition, their sources, and the
experiments within which they are used.
Dataset Name Total Apps Source Usage
AMD+GPlay
24,553 AMD ’s Website ◦ Training ML-based labeling strategies (Section 4)
24,162 AndroZoo’s servers ◦ Calculating scanner correctness (Section 4.2)
AndroZoo 6,172 AndroZoo’s servers ◦ Training ML-based detection methods (Section 5.2)
Hand-Labeled 100 AndroZoo’s servers
◦ Demonstrating impact of VirusTotal’s dynamicity on threshold-based labeling strategies (Section 3)
◦ Testing accuracy of labeling strategies (Section 5.1)
◦ Testing accuracy of ML-based detection methods (Section 5.2)
Hand-Labeled 2019 100 AndroZoo’s servers
◦ Demonstrating impact of VirusTotal’s dynamicity on threshold-based labeling strategies (Section 3)
◦ Testing accuracy of labeling strategies (Section 5.1)
◦ Testing accuracy of ML-based detection methods (Section 5.2)
The largest dataset we use in this paper is a combination of 24,553 malicious apps from the
AMD dataset [47] and 24,162 benign apps we downloaded from AndroZoo [3]. The malicious
apps of AMD are meant to provide an overview of malicious behaviors that can be found
in Android malware, spanning different malware families (e.g., DroidKungFu[52], Airpush[7],
Dowgin[9], etc.) and different malware types (e.g., Adware, Ransomware(ware), and Trojan).
To build the dataset, the authors of AMD only considered apps whose VirusTotal scan
reports indicate that at least 50% of the scanners deem them as malicious, clustered them
into 135 malware families, and manually analyzed samples of each family to ensure their
malignancy. After analysis, the behavior of each family is represented as human-readable,
graphical representation2 of the behavior adopted by apps in each of the 135 malware
families that can be found in the dataset. The involvement of human operators in labeling
the apps and the high number of scanners deeming them malicious significantly decreases
the likelihood of a benign app being mistakenly labeled as malicious. So, we consider all
apps in the AMD dataset as malicious.
As for the benign apps we acquired from AndroZoo, we downloaded a total of 30,023 apps
that were gathered from the Android official app store, Google Play. Google Play employs
various checks to ensure the sanity of an app upon being uploaded [26], but sometimes
malicious apps make it to the marketplace [19, 45]. So, we only considered apps whose
VirusTotal scan reports indicate that no scanners deemed them as malicious at any point
in time. This criterion does not guarantee that the apps’ scan reports will continue to have
a positives attribute of zero in the future. However, given that the apps were collected from
Google Play, which already employs various checks to ensure the sanity of an app upon
being uploaded to the marketplace [26], we presume that the VirusTotal scan reports of
such apps will not radically change in the future. Consequently, we consider all apps in the
GPlay dataset that fit the aforementioned criterion (i.e., 24,162 apps) as benign.
We refer to the combination of apps in the two previous datasets as AMD+GPlay, whose
VirusTotal scan reports are used to train Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies. On April
12th , 2019, we downloaded the existing scan reports of those apps. The overwhelming
majority of the apps in the AMD dataset were last scanned in 2018, albeit spread across
different months. For simplicity, we refer to those multiple points in time as 2018 to mark the
year in which the apps were last scanned. Between April 12th , 2019, and November 8th , 2019,
we reanalyzed all of the 53K apps and downloaded the latest versions of their VirusTotal
reports every two weeks in accordance with Kantchelian et al.’s recommendations [15]. Aware
2Example: Airpush family’s first variety (http://tiny.cc/34d86y)
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5of the fact that some apps in the dataset are as old as eight years, we attempted to acquire
their older VirusTotal scan reports. Unfortunately, access to such reports is not available
under academic licenses.
The second dataset we use is a random collection of 6,172 apps developed in between 2018
and 2019 and downloaded from AndroZoo. So, we refer to it as AndroZoo throughout this
paper. Unlike apps in AMD+GPlay, this dataset does not focus on a particular marketplace
or class (e.g., malicious). This dataset is used Section 5 to assess the ability of different
labeling strategies to train more accurate detection methods. This dataset is meant to
simulate the process of a researcher acquiring new Android apps and labeling them to train a
ML-based detection method that detects novel Android malware, that VirusTotal scanners
are yet to assign labels to. So, we use apps in this dataset to statically extract numerical
features from their APK archives, represent them as vectors, and use them for training
different types of machine learning classifiers. We use different threshold-based and ML-
based labeling strategies to label those feature vectors prior to training the aforementioned
classifiers.
The trained classifiers are then used to label apps in two small test datasets and compare
the predicted labels with the ground truth. We refer to those small datasets as Hand-Labeled3
and Hand-Labeled 2019 4. Both datasets comprise 100 Android apps that were downloaded
from AndroZoo and manually analyzed and labeled, to acquire reliable ground truth. The
exact process we adopted in analyzing and labeling those apps can be found online. The
primary difference between both datasets is that apps in the latter were developed in 2019.
We ensured that apps in both datasets do not overlap with apps in the AMD+GPlay and
AndroZoo datasets. We manually analyzed such 200 apps to acquire reliable ground truth
that depicts the apps’ true nature.
3 MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
During the evaluation of an Android malware detection method we implemented, we came
across a dubious scenario involving a test app called TP.LoanCalculator that is part of the
Piggybacking [17] dataset. Despite being labeled by the dataset authors as malicious, our
detection method deemed this test app5 as benign because it had the same metadata (e.g.,
package name and description), compiler, and even codebase as one benign app6 that the
detection methods keeps in a repository of reference benign apps.
Apps in the Piggybacking dataset were labeled with the aid of VirusTotal scan reports [17].
After querying VirusTotal for the scan reports of both apps, we found that the test app was
labeled malicious by 14 out of 60 antiviral software scanners, whereas all scanners deemed
the reference app as benign, which coincides with the authors’ labels. However, we noticed
that the scan reports acquired from VirusTotal indicated that the apps were last analyzed
in 2013. So, we submitted the apps’ Android Package (APK) archives for re-analysis in 2018
to see whether the number of scanners would differ. After re-analysis, the malicious test app
had three more scanners deemed it malicious. More importantly, the number of scanners
deeming the benign reference app as malicious changed from zero to 17 after re-analysis.
So, the reference app initially labeled and released as part of the Piggybacking dataset as a
benign app is, in fact, another version of a malicious app of the type Adware.
3http://tiny.cc/95bhaz
4http://tiny.cc/a7bhaz
52b44135f245a2bd104c4b50dc9df889dbd8bc79b
6d8472cf8dcc98bc124bd5144bb2689785e245d83
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Fig. 1. The labeling accuracy of different threshold-based labeling strategies against apps in Hand-Labeled
and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets based on their VirusTotal scan reports downloaded between July 5th ,
2019 and November 8th , 2019. Accuracy is calculated in terms of the Matthews Correlation Coefficient
(MCC) of each labeling strategy.
The authors of Piggybacking did not intentionally mislabel apps. The most likely scenario
is that, at the time of releasing the dataset, the reference app was still deemed as benign by
the VirusTotal scanners. To further demonstrate the impact of time on the scan reports
of both apps, we reanalyzed them six months later (i.e., in April 2019), to check whether
the number of VirusTotal scanners deeming them malicious changed. We found that the
number of scanners deeming the test and reference apps as malicious decreased from 17
to 11 and 10 scanners, respectively. Moreover, the total number of scanners respectively
changed from 60 scanners to 59 and 57.
Another interesting fact is that the percentages of scanners deeming both apps as malicious
are 18.64% and 19.3%, with some renowned scanners including AVG, McAfee, Kaspersky,
Microsoft, and TrendMicro continuing to deem both apps as benign. According to the
dataset authors’ strategy to label an app as malicious if at least one scanner deems it so [17],
both apps would be labeled as malicious. The same would not hold for the authors of the
AMD dataset who consider an app as malicious if at least 50% of the VirusTotal scanners
deem it malicious [47].
With this example, we wish to demonstrate the following issues with using VirusTotal
to label Android apps. First, the lack of a standard method to interpret VirusTotal’s scan
results encourages researchers to use different threshold-based labeling strategies to label
apps, which might lead to completely different verdicts on the labels of the same apps.
Assuming that the research community manages to standardize the thresholds used to label
apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports, the second issue is that such scan reports are
dynamic and continuously change over time due to either (a) scanners updating their verdicts
on some apps or (b) the platform adding/removing scanners [23, 24]. This continuous change
leads to scan report attributes, such as the number of scanners deeming an app as malicious
(i.e., positives), to fluctuate. Consequently, thresholds that used to reflect the ground truth
of an app accurately are also expected to change.
To demonstrate the fluctuations of VirusTotal’s scan reports and its attributes and how
that impacts the performance of threshold-based labeling strategies, consider the plots
in Figure 1. In this figure we plot the performance of different threshold-based labeling
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7strategies, including ones previously-utilized within the literature, on the Hand-Labeled
and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets between July 5th , 2019 and November 8th , 2019 in terms
of MCC metric [39]. As seen in the figure, the labeling accuracy noticeably differs from
on threshold-based labeling strategy to another. For example, researchers using vt≥3 or
vt≥4 [8, 23] to label apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset will get more accurate labels than
those adopting vt≥1 [17] or vt≥50% [47]. Moreover, the accuracies of such labeling strategies
appear to fluctuate over a mere period of four months especially against recently-developed
Android (malicious) apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset. In conclusion, the dynamicity of
VirusTotal means that fixed thresholds cannot be relied on for prolonged periods of time to
label Android apps as malicious and benign. So, researchers have to analyze VirusTotal scan
reports in order to identify the currently optimal threshold to use in the labeling process,
which is indeed a time-consuming process. This process is further prolonged by the fact
that VirusTotal does not automatically re-analyze the apps it possesses in its repositories
and relies on its users to manually initiate re-scans. Needless to say, the larger the datasets
a researcher possesses, the longer it takes to re-scan all apps given the limitations on the
number of Application Programming Interface (API) requests allowed per day for academic
licenses.
VirusTotal Limitation 1
VirusTotal does not rescan the apps it possesses on a regular basis and delegates this task to manual
requests issued by its users. One direct consequence of this decision is prolonging the process of
acquiring up-to-date scan reports of apps especially under academic licenses that grant users a limit
of 30K API requests per day.
4 MAAT’S ML-BASED LABELING STRATEGIES
In the previous section, we demonstrated the subjectivity of threshold-based labeling strate-
gies and their sensitivity to VirusTotal’s dynamicity and evolution. This dynamicity forces
researchers to identify the current optimal thresholds, which entails a semi-automatic process
that is infeasible to perform on a regular basis. Our framework, Maat, is designed to
address these problems as follows. First, to avoid the subjectivity of threshold-based labeling
strategies, Maat provides the research community with a systematic and standardized
method to analyze VirusTotal scan reports to devise labeling strategies. Second, Maat’s
processes of analyzing VirusTotal scan reports and of devising ML-based labeling strategies
are on-demand and fully automated. Third, the resulting ML-based labeling strategies do
not rely on a fixed number of VirusTotal scanners to label apps as malicious and benign.
Instead, using two different types of features extracted from VirusTotal scan reports, Maat
relies on ML algorithms to identify the currently correct and stable VirusTotal scanners,
which makes them less susceptible to the dynamicity of VirusTotal and the changes it
introduces to apps’ scan reports.
4.1 Overview
Prior to delving into the measurements and experiments we performed, we briefly discuss how
our method, Maat, mines VirusTotal scan reports to build ML-based labeling strategies.
As seen in Figure 2, Maat starts by analyzing the VirusTotal scan reports of apps in the
training dataset that we explicitly reanalyzed via VirusTotal and downloaded at different
points in time (i.e., t0, t1, ..., tm). The training dataset that Maat uses to train ML-based
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: July 2020.
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Fig. 2. The process adopted by Maat to construct ML-based labeling strategies by analyzing VirusTotal
scan reports and training a random forest to label apps as malicious and benign according to their
VirusTotal scan reports.
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labeling strategies comprises the scan reports of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset gathered
between 2018 and September 27th , 2019.
In phase (1) from Figure 2 we identify the VirusTotal scanners that achieve an average
overall correctness score7 of at least 90% between 2018 and September 27th , 2019 as the
most correct scanners. Maat also finds the scanners that changed their verdicts at most
10% of the time (i.e., were stable 90% of the time), are considered in the next phase to
extract features from the scan reports. The output of this phase is an intersection of the
most correct and stable VirusTotal scanners. The exact processes we adopted to find the
most correct and stable scanners are detailed in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, respectively.
In phase (2), we extract features from the VirusTotal scan reports of apps in the
AMD+GPlay dataset. There are two types of features we extract from the reports, namely
engineered features and naive features.
Engineered features attempt to leverage the insights we gained from the previous sections
(e.g., which scanners are correct). So, based on the output from phase (1), we consider the
verdicts given to apps in the training dataset only by the set of most correct and stable
scanners. To accommodate the impact of time on the maturity of an app’s scan report, we
also include the age of a scan report in years, the number of times an app has been submitted
for (re)analysis (i.e., times_submitted), the positives attribute, and the total attribute in
this feature set. Lastly, to capture any patterns that Android (malicious) apps share in
terms of functionalities and runtime behaviors, we extract from the VirusTotal scan reports
the permissions that apps request in their AndroidManifest.xml files, and the tags given to
them by VirusTotal (e.g., checks-gps, contains-elf, sends-sms, etc.).
Naive features do not consider the outputs of phase (1). With naive features, we consider
the verdicts given by all VirusTotal scanners to the apps in the training dataset. So,
the feature vector extracted from a VirusTotal scan report will be a sequence of integers
depicting the label given by each scanner to an app (i.e., -1 for not scanned, 0 for scanned
and deemed benign, and 1 for scanned and deemed malicious). For example, assume that the
scan report of an arbitrary app (α∗) contained scan results of three scanners, that respectively
7The correctness score is based on the ground truths given by the authors of AMD to apps using their
hybrid analysis process that combines relying on VirusTotal scan reports and manual analysis as discussed
in Section 2.
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9deemed (α∗) as malicious, malicious, and benign, the feature vector depicting this scan report
will be (xˆα ∗ = (1, 1, 0)). With naive features, we allow ML-based labeling strategies to utilize
the verdicts of all VirusTotal freely scanners regardless of their correctness or stability.
Phase (3) is an optional phase that selects the most informative features extracted from
the training dataset’s scan reports. To avoid having to choose the number of features to select
arbitrarily, we utilize the SelectFromModel [36] technique to select the most informative
features automatically. In essence, this technique selects features based on the importance
given to them by a model (e.g., logistic regression, support vector machines, decision trees,
etc.). For example, during training, decision trees iteratively utilize a criterion (e.g., Gini
index), to decide upon the next feature to consider in splitting data points into two, or
more, classes; in our case, this feature could be a scanner’s verdict regarding the label of an
app. Ultimately, the trained tree will compile a set of features that it used during splitting
and assign an importance value to each one of them. The SelectFromModel feature selection
technique uses such importance values and returns the user those features with importance
values more than a preset threshold (i.e., 1 × 10−5 in the case of decision trees). For our
experiments, we rely on decision trees as the model used by the SelectFromModel technique
to extract the most informative features.
We envision the process of utilizing the features extracted from VirusTotal scan reports
to label apps as a series or combination of questions, such as how many scanners deem the
app malicious? how old is the app? does a renowned scanner (e.g., AVG) deem the app as
malicious? The machine learning classifier that mimics this model, we reckon, is a decision
tree. In order not to rely on the decisions made by a single tree, Maat trains ML-based
labeling strategy as a collection of trees or a random forest. To estimate the hyperparameters
(e.g., the maximum depth each tree is allowed to grow), that train the most effective forests,
we use the technique of grid search [37] to select from among a set of parameters listed in on
Maat’s website In our experiments, we compare the performance of random forests trained
using both search techniques.
The output of phase (4) is a random forest that takes a vector of numerical features
extracted from an app’s VirusTotal scan report and returns a label depicting the class
of the app (i.e., 1.0 for malicious and 0.0 for benign). Effectively, this random forest is a
labeling strategy. In phase (5), given the VirusTotal scan report of an arbitrary Android
app, the report is represented as a feature vector that matches the features used by the
random forest (e.g., naive versus engineered features), and is used to predict the app’s class.
4.2 Correctness of VirusTotal Scanners
As part of extracting engineered features to train ML-based labeling strategies, in this section,
we describe the process adopted by Maat to find the set most accurate VirusTotal scanners
during a given period of time. Given the scan reports of apps in the training dataset gathered
over a period of time, Maat relies on Mohaisen et al.’s definition of scanner correctness
to identify the set of correctVirusTotal scanners over this period. In [24], Mohaisen et al.
defined correctness as follows: For a given dataset, the correctness of an antiviral scanner
is the number of correct detections normalized by the size of the dataset. So, for each
VirusTotal scanner, Maat calculates the number of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset
that it managed to correctly label as malicious, and divide that number by the size of the
dataset. The correctness scores of each scanner at different points in time are then averaged.
Scanners whose correctness scores are greater than or equal to 0.90 are included in the set
of correct VirusTotal scanners. We chose the number 0.90 to tolerate any fluctuations in
the correctness rate that may occur, for example, due to changing policies on how to label
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ambiguous malware types, such as Adware, or the temporary use of inadequate versions of
scanners. So, the definition of a correct scanner we adopt in this paper is:
Definition
A correct VirusTotal scanner is one that is able to correctly label apps in a given dataset of
pre-labeled apps, such that the number of correctly labeled apps over the total number of apps in
the dataset is greater than or equal to 0.90.
Using this criterion, we retrieved a list of 18 scanners, namely AhnLab-V3, Avira, Babable,
CAT-QuickHeal, Comodo, Cyren, DrWeb, ESET-NOD32, F-Secure, Fortinet, Ikarus, K7GW, MAX,
McAfee, NANO-Antivirus, Sophos, SymantecMobileInsight, and Trustlook.
The number of scanners that Maat identified to be correct between 2018 and September
27th , 2019 on the AMD+GPlay dataset noticeably differs from the ten scanner Arp et al.
used in 2014 to label apps in their Drebin dataset [4]; only five Drebin out of ten are included
in Maat’s list of correct scanners. Apart from deeming them as popular and trustworthy,
the authors did not mention why they chose those ten scanners. Intuitively, Arp et al. used
a different set of Android apps and older versions of scan reports, which implies that the
set of correct scanners might change from one set of Android apps to another and from
time to time. In other words, there are no set of VirusTotal scanners that are universally
correct on different datasets. To verify this, we retrieved the set of scanners that maintained
correctness scores of 90% or higher over a period of time for the AMD, AMD+GPlay, GPlay,
Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets (i.e., the datasets with known ground truths).
Since we downloaded the apps in the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets after
downloading apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset, we started re-scanning and downloading
their latest VirusTotal scan reports at later points in time, viz. starting from July 15th , 2019
instead of 2018. So, to perform an objective measurement, we retrieved the list of correct
VirusTotal scanners for the AMD+GPlay, Hand-Labeled, Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets within
the same time period, namely between July 15th , 2019 and September 27th , 2019. As seen
in Table 2, the set of VirusTotal scanners that have correctness rates of at least 90% differ
from one dataset to another, despite being based on scan reports downloaded within the
same period. Only a set of five scanners continued to be the most correct in labeling apps in
all datasets, viz. ESET-NOD32, Fortinet, Ikarus, McAfee, and SymantecMobileInsight. As
for the GPlay dataset, a total of 58 correct scanners were found to be correct, which we
could not fit in the table.
We made the following observations based on the results in the table. Firstly, the number
of correct scanners found by Maat using apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset remained the
same (i.e., 18 scanners). However, between July 15th , 2019 and September 27th , 2019, Maat
found the TheHacker scanner to be more accurate than the Babable. Secondly, we noticed
that adding more benign apps to a dataset increases the number of scanners found to be
correct. In other words, the more malicious apps in a dataset, the lower the number of
correct scanners. For example, adding the scan reports of apps in the GPlay dataset to their
AMD counterparts increases the number of scanners found to be correct between July 15th ,
2019 and September 27th , 2019 from 12 scanners to 18 scanners. On a smaller scale, one
can notice the same pattern in the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets. Since
the former dataset has less benign apps and more malicious ones (i.e., 76 benign versus 24
malicious), the number of scanners found to be correct is less than that for the latter dataset
that has 90 benign apps and only ten malicious ones. The reason behind this, we argue, is
that benign apps do not reveal the detection ability of an antiviral scanner. That is, deeming
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Table 2. The set of VirusTotal scanners that had correctness rates of at least 90% between July 15th ,
2019 and November 8th , 2019. Emboldened scanners depict the intersection of the sets of correct
scanners of the four datasets.
Dataset Scanner(s) Total
AMD+GPlay
AhnLab-V3, Avira, CAT-QuickHeal, Comodo, Cyren,
DrWeb, ESET-NOD32, F-Secure, Fortinet,
Ikarus, K7GW, MAX, McAfee, NANO-Antivirus,
Sophos, SymantecMobileInsight, TheHacker, Trustlook
18
AMD
Avira, CAT-QuickHeal, DrWeb, ESET-NOD32, F-Secure,
Fortinet, Ikarus, MAX, McAfee, NANO-Antivirus,
Sophos, SymantecMobileInsight
12
Hand-Labeled
AhnLab-V3, CAT-QuickHeal, Cyren, ESET-NOD32, Fortinet, Ikarus,
K7GW, McAfee, Sophos, SymantecMobileInsight, Trustlook 11
Hand-Labeled 2019
Ad-Aware, AegisLab, AhnLab-V3, Alibaba, Arcabit,
Avast-Mobile, BitDefender, ClamAV, Cyren, DrWeb,
ESET-NOD32, Emsisoft, F-Secure, FireEye, Fortinet,
GData, Ikarus, Jiangmin, K7AntiVirus, K7GW,
Kaspersky, Kingsoft, MAX, MalwareBytes, McAfee,
McAfee-GW-Edition, MicroWorld-eScan, Microsoft, NANO-Antivirus, Qihoo-360,
SUPERAntiSpyware, SymantecMobileInsight, Trustlook, ViRobot, Yandex,
ZoneAlarm, Zoner
37
a benign app as benign does not reveal whether the app has been analyzed and consciously
deemed as such, or whether the scanner did not scan the app before. Malicious apps, on
the other hand, reveal the competence of a scanner; detecting a malicious app implies that
the app has been analyzed and deemed malicious. In summary, adding more malicious apps
seems to filter out incompetent scanners.
What we learned from this measurement is that the set of VirusTotal scanners that are
correct over time might change depending on (a) the dataset itself and its composition in
terms of benign and malicious apps, and (b) the time period within which the VirusTotal
scan reports were gathered. However, we noticed that there is a subset of scanners that
persist across different datasets, viz. the five scanners ESET-NOD32, Fortinet, Ikarus, McAfee,
and SymantecMobileInsight. So, is there a universal set of VirusTotal scanners that are
correct across different points in time and different datasets? The answer depends on the
definition of a universal set. If researchers expect that set of scanners to maintain the same
scanners and cardinality, then the answer is no. However, it is expected for a small set of
VirusTotal scanners to persist within the set of correct scanners longer than others.
As discussed earlier, the composition of a dataset might affect the set of correct scanners
because adding more benign apps to the dataset conceals the mediocrity of some scanners.
Now the question is why and how does time impact the performance of an antiviral scanner
on VirusTotal? One possible answer is the scanners suffer technical difficulties, which is
reflected in their detection performance. A more concerning possbility is that VirusTotal
changes the set of scanners it includes in the scan reports of apps across time. Since we
calculate correctness based on the verdicts of scanners found in VirusTotal’s scan reports,
excluding a scanner’s verdict from such scan reports will give the wrong impression that
the scanner was unable to classify the apps correctly and, in turn, decrease the scanner’s
correctness score. Luckily, Maat supports tabulating and visualizing the correctness of
VirusTotal scanners to provide its users with further insights about the performance of
different scanners over time. For example, Figure 3 displays the correctness scores of ten
scanners utilized by Arp et al. in [4] to label apps in the Drebin dataset. These scanners
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Fig. 3. The overall correctness rates of the Drebin scanners on apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset between
2018 and November 8th , 2019.
are AntiVir8, AVG, BitDefender, ClamAV, ESET, F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee, Panda, and
Sophos. We refer to this group of scanners as the Drebin scanners.
The correctness scores in the figure imply that some scanners are more correct and stable
than others. However, the performance of F-Secure and BitDefender raise the following
concerns. The correctness of F-Secure appears to noticeably oscillate on a frequent basis.
For example, the overall correctness of F-Secure steeply dropped from above 0.90 on June
7th , 2019 to around 0.70 on June 21st , 2019 only to increase to 0.90 two weeks later on
July 15th , 2019. While it might be acceptable that the performance of an antiviral scanner
drops and remains low, such as the case of BitDefender, there is no apparent reason for
the frequent fluctuations in performance. In what appears to be a random decision, we
found that VirusTotal excludes the verdicts of F-Secure from the scan reports of apps in
the AMD+GPlay dataset. For example, on the dates April 26th , 2019, May 10th 2019, and
May 24th , 2019, the verdicts of F-Secure were included in the scan reports of all, 98%, and
97% of apps in the dataset, respectively. Consequently, due to the exclusion of the scanner
from the scan reports of some apps, the correctness scores of F-Secure on those dates were
respectively 0.92, 0.90, and 0.88. Moreover, we found that the scanner alters its verdicts
across different points in time. For instance, despite being included in fewer scan reports on
June 7th , 2019 (i.e., 96% instead of 97%), its correctness score increased from 0.88 to 0.94.
So, a combination of its own internal decisions and VirusTotal’s exclusions contributed to
its fluctuating performance.
VirusTotal Limitation 2
VirusTotal changes the set of scanners it includes in the scan reports of apps over time by including
and excluding the verdicts of scanners regardless of the quality of those verdicts.
Second, despite its mediocre performance as reported by VirusTotal, BitDefender contin-
ues to be given good reviews by users on the Google Play marketplace and, more importantly,
8AntiVir refers to the antiviral scanner developed by Avira, which is the name that VirusTotal uses for this
scanner now.
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on platforms that assess the effectiveness of antiviral software such as AV-Test [13]. Given
that VirusTotal states that the versions of scanners it uses "may differ from commercial
off-the-shelf products. The [antiviral software] company decides the particular settings with
which the engine should run in VirusTotal" [44], we compared the VirusTotal version of
BitDefender against the one that can be found on the Google Play app marketplace. We
found that, as of September 2019, the version used by VirusTotal’s for BitDefender is 7.2,
whereas the versions available on Google Play have codes between 3.3 and 3.6. The 7.2 version
of BitDefender corresponds to a free edition version developed for Windows-based malware
that targets older versions of Windows such as Windows XP [20]. The positive reputation
that BitDefender has in the market suggests that using its adequate version (i.e., the one
that is designed to detect Android malware), would yield a detection performance better
than the version on VirusTotal. To verify this hypothesis, we downloaded and installed the
latest version of the BitDefender scanner from the Google Play marketplace, installed it on
an Android Virtual Device (AVD), and used it to scan ten apps randomly sampled from the
AMD dataset. Unlike the results obtained from VirusTotal that the scanners are unable to
detect any of those apps, we found that BitDefender detects 70% of the sampled apps.
VirusTotal Limitation 3
VirusTotal may replace the versions of scanners with inadequate ones that are not designed to
detect Android malware presumably based on the request of the scanner’s vendor or managing firm.
So, do some antiviral software companies believe that offering older versions on VirusTotal
will encourage users to download their products instead of relying on the online version
available on VirusTotal? Do such companies enforce a fee on VirusTotal in order to use
their new products, which the latter did not agree to? Answering those questions is not in
the scope of this paper and, in fact, impossible to answer on behalf of antiviral software
companies.
4.3 Stability of VirusTotal Scanners and Scan Reports
Whether due to the dynamicity of VirusTotal or internal decisions, the examples of F-Secure
and BitDefender in the previous section show that some VirusTotal scanners have unstable,
fluctuating performance. To train reliable ML-based labeling strategies, Maat attempts to
rely on VirusTotal scanners that do not often change the labels they assign to Android apps
(i.e., stable scanners). Maat identifies stable VirusTotal scanners over a period of time
by considering those scanners whose certainty score exceeds 0.90. This score is calculated
as follows. For each scanner, the labels given by the scanner to each app in the training
dataset (i.e., AMD+GPlay), over a period of time are retrieved. Regardless of the correctness
of the labels, the certainty score is calculated by dividing the total number of the most
common label (i.e., malicious versus benign) by the total number of scanners. Effectively,
the score calculates the variance of the labels that are given to apps by VirusTotal scanners
approaching zero over a period of time. As an example, say that ESET-NOD32 had the labels
{malicious, benign, malicious, malicious} for an app (α); the certainty score will be three
(i.e., counts of malicious), divided by a total of four labels yielding a percentage of 0.75. To
calculate the certainty score for an entire dataset, Maat averages the scanners’ certainty
scores achieved on individual apps in this dataset.
Similar to the case with the correctness scores, Maat’s default threshold of the certainty
score is 0.90 to allow for marginal fluctuations in the labels given to apps by scanners, which
might be a result of VirusTotal excluding those scanners from the apps’ scan reports or
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changing their versions to inadequate ones. So, we define a stable VirusTotal scanner in
this paper as follows:
Definition
A stable VirusTotal scanner is one that achieves an average certainty score of at least 0.90 on apps
in a given dataset over a period of time. This score indicates that, on average and regardless of the
correctness of the assigned label, the scanner maintained the same label it assigns to an app 90% of
the time.
Using this threshold, Maat retrieved a set of 44 scanners (i.e., 74.5%) that had certainty
scores of at least 0.90 on apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset between 2018 and September
27th , 2019. Unfortunately, VirusTotal does not grant access to the history of scan reports
of apps under academic licenses, which hinders our efforts to assess the stability of different
scanners to periods before 2018
VirusTotal Limitation 4
VirusTotal does not grant access to academic researchers to the history of scan reports of apps
previously added and scanned on the platform, even if such apps were added by the academic
community itself.
However, it is worth mentioning that any definition of stability or method to retrieve the
most stable scanners, including this one, suffers from two limitations. Firstly, there is no
absolute guarantee that the performance of a VirusTotal scanner will continue to be the
same, either because of technical difficulties suffered by an antiviral software company or
because of VirusTotal’s utilization of different versions of a scanner, as seen in the case
of BitDefender. Secondly, any definition of stability does not guarantee correctness. Over
the past three years, we tracked the verdicts given by VirusTotal scanners to a repackaged,
malicious version9 of the K9 Mail open source app [1] that has been developed by one of
our students during a practical course. Despite being a malicious app of type Ransom, the
scanners continued to unanimously deem the app as benign since February 8th , 2017, even
after analyzing and re-scanning the app. Another example is an app10 that we repackaged
three years ago; the app continued to be labeled as benign by all scanners until only K7GW
recognized the app’s malignancy in July 2019 and labeled it as a Trojan. As mentioned in
the previous section, Maat is meant to help optimally utilize VirusTotal and interpret its
scan results, but it cannot control either its dynamicity or correctness of its VirusTotal.
So, since the set of stable scanners may change in the future as VirusTotal changes, it is
recommended to re-train Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies that rely on the set of stable
scanners whenever possible (e.g., after re-scanning the apps in the framework’s training
dataset and downloading their up-to-date scan reports). The more interesting insight, we
argue, is that the majority of antiviral software firms that allow VirusTotal to utilize their
products do not seem to rely on the platform as a source of apps to analyze and include in
their signatures database. So, it seems that those firms mainly focus on Android malicious
found in the wild (e.g., in an app marketplace), and pay little to no attention to ones that
are uploaded to platforms, such as VirusTotal, even if they are malicious.
9aa0d0f82c0a84b8dfc4ecda89a83f171cf675a9a
1066c16d79db25dc9d602617dae0485fa5ae6e54b2: A calculator app grafted with a logic-based trigger that
deletes user contacts only if the result of the performed arithmetic operation is 50.
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4.4 Features Extracted from Scan Reports
In this section, we recap on the type of features that Maat extracts from the VirusTotal
scan reports of its training dataset, and relate them to the insights we gained from the
measurements performed in the previous sections. As mentioned in Section 4.1, there are two
types of features that Maat can extract from scan reports, namely engineered and naive.
Engineered Features. .
The engineered featuresMaat extracts from scan reports (listed online) can be divided into
three caegories. In the first category of features, Maat considers the verdicts of VirusTotal
scanners that had a correctness score and a certainty score of at least 0.90. As seen in
Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, the performance of some correct scanners, such as F-Secure,
fluctuates over time (i.e., not stable), whereas the stability of scanners in general does not
guarantee correctness. To mitigate both issues, Maat relies on the verdicts given by the
intersection of correct and stable scanners. Taking the intersection between the 18 correct
scanners the 44 stable scanners yields a set of 16 VirusTotal scanners that include all
the correct scanners apart from F-Secure, which already exhibited fluctuation in detection
performance (see Section 4.2), and Trustlook. The reason behind this is that the continuity
of correctly labeling apps leads to the stability of labels. In other words, if a scanner is
consistently accurate at giving the same, correct label to an app, it is ipso facto a stable
scanner. This relationship between correctness and stability, as discussed before, does not go
the other way around (i.e., stability does not imply correctness).
The second category of features is based on attributes found in VirusTotal scan reports
that imply the age and, perhaps, the maturity of the app and its scan report.Maat extracts
the age of the app’s scan report as the difference between the extraction date and that of
first_seen along with the times_submitted attribute, the positives attribute, and the total
attribute. The first two features are meant to reflect the maturity of an app’s scan report.
In our analysis, we noticed that older malicious apps have higher ranges of positives and
total values than newer ones. For example, as of September 27th , 2019, the malicious apps in
the AMD dataset have an average positives value of 26.26±5.53 and and average total value
of 59.91±1.13. Regardless of how malicious they are, newly-developed malicious apps–and
indeed false-positive benign apps–can never reach those ranges, perhaps for years. So, we
thought that such values might assist Maat to discern malicious, benign, and ambiguous
malicious apps.
The third and last category of engineered features is meant to approximate the structure
and behavior of apps. Malicious apps tend to adopt similar structures, re-use libraries, exploit
similar vulnerabilities, or share the same codebases. We assume that such trends can be
reflected in the permissions these apps request and the tags assigned to them by VirusTotal.
So, as part of the engineered features, we include the list of permissions (not) requested by
the app and the tags (not) assigned to them by VirusTotal.
In total,Maat extracts 372 features from the VirusTotal scan report of each app. Having
discussed the impact of the curse of dimensionality on the performance of ML algorithms, we
implementedMaat to select the most informative features from this feature set. In Section 5,
we discuss the types of features selected from the full corpus of engineered features.
Naive Features. Naive features comprise the verdicts of all VirusTotal scanners, regard-
less of their correctness or stability. With this set of features, as mentioned earlier, we allow
Maat’s random forests to identify and choose the VirusTotal scanners that train the most
effective ML-based labeling strategies. We use this type of feature for three reasons. First,
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naive features are fast and easy to extract from VirusTotal scan reports. Second, we wish
to investigate whether allowing Maat’s random forests to select scanners would yield a set
of scanners that overlap with the ones identified using the measurements in Section 4.2 and
Section 4.3. Third, we wish to assess whether the second and third categories of engineered
features help Maat train better ML-based labeling strategies or hinder their performance.
The dimensionality of naive features is 60 scanners. However, we also allow Maat to select
the most informative features (i.e., scanner verdicts, in this case). As of September 27th ,
2019, using the scan reports of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset, the set of scanners selected
from the full corpus of naive features comprised 16 scanners.
5 EVALUATING MAAT
As discussed in Section 1, the accurate labeling of previously-analyzed and detected apps is
fundamental for the effectiveness of detection methods. So, the quality of labeling strategies
can be assessed in terms of (a) their abilities to assign labels to previously-analyzed apps
(e.g., based on their VirusTotal scan reports) that accurately reflect their ground truth,
and (b) the extent to which such accurate labeling contributes to the effectiveness of
detection methods against out-of-sample apps. In this section, we evaluate the performance
of threshold-based labeling strategies versus Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies according
to the aforementioned two criteria. In Section 5.1, we verify whether Maat’s ML-based
labeling strategies trained at one point in time can maintain labeling accuracies in the future
that rival those achieved using threshold-based labeling strategies that adopt the current
optimal thresholds. The second set of experiments in Section 5.2 compares the impact of
threshold-based labeling strategies versus that of Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies on
the effectiveness of ML-based detection methods against out-of-sample apps over time.
5.1 Accurately Labeling Apps
The main objective in this set of experiments is to verify whether ML-based labeling strategies
trained at one point in time can sustain a similar labeling accuracy using VirusTotal scan
reports downloaded in the future. If true, then unlike their threshold-based counterparts,
Maat ML-based labeling strategies do not need to be re-trained regularly to accommodate
for VirusTotal’s dynamicity. So, we trained Maat ML-based labeling strategies using
VirusTotal scan reports of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset downloaded on 2018, and used
the trained strategies to label apps in the test datasets Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled
2019 datasets between July 5th , 2019 and November 8th , 2019. In the experiments, we used
ML-based labeling strategies that use the two types of features mentioned in Section 4.4 (i.e.,
engineered versus naive) and trained using the technique of grid search. We also included
labeling strategies that used the SelectFromModel technique to select the most informative
features. For readability, we shorten the names of ML labeling strategies in the following
manner: engineered and naive features are referred to as Eng and Naive, respectively, grid
search is referred to as GS, and strategies that use selected features are referred to using Sel.
For example, a labeling strategy that uses selected engineered features and the grid search
techniques will be referred to as Eng Sel GS.
Figure 4 depicts an example of the results we are discussing in this section. In this figure,
we compare the labeling performance of the ML-based labeling strategies trained using scan
reports from 2018 against two types of threshold-based labeling strategies. The solid red line
depicts the performance of threshold-based strategies using the optimal threshold at each
scan date identified as follows. At each scan date, we calculated the labeling accuracy of
each threshold between one and 60 against apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset. The threshold
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that yields the best MCC scores is considered as the optimal threshold for this scan date.
For example, using scan reports of the AMD+GPlay dataset re-scanned and downloaded
on July 5th , 2019, the optimal threshold was found to be 12 VirusTotal scanners. So, the
labeling strategy used to label apps in the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets
on July 5th , 2019 is vt≥12. The other type of threshold-based labeling strategies we use
(dashed orange line) depicts strategies that use the optimal threshold that would achieve
the best MCC scores on each of the test datasets. These thresholds are found by trying
different thresholds on the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets. They are meant
to simulate a scenario in which a researcher always manages to find the thresholds that yield
the best possible MCC scores on the test datasets. Effectively, the performance of these
thresholds depicts an upper bound on the performance of threshold-based labeling strategies
on the test datasets.
The performance of the brute-forced thresholds in Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrates the
main limitation of the brute forcing approach to finding the optimal threshold of VirusTotal
scanners at a given point in time: in order for the thresholds obtained by brute-forcing all
possible values to generalize to new Android malware, the dataset used to find these optimal
thresholds needs to be temporally diverse. Given that the AMD+GPlay dataset does not
contain apps developed in 2019, the identified thresholds were high (i.e., between 10 and 13
scanners), and could not accurately label apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset. As for
Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies, with a few exceptions, we found that (a) their MCC
scores mimicked that of the best possible threshold at each scan date and (b) had stable
MCC scores over the period of time between July 5th , 2019 and November 8th , 2019. Recall
that for all scan dates, we used ML-based labeling strategies trained using VirusTotal scan
reports that date back to different months in 2018 and using a dataset of older apps (i.e.,
AMD+GPlay). This means that using VirusTotal scan reports of older apps, such labeling
strategies can maintain decent, stable labeling accuracies for at least a year even against
newer apps.
We made the following observations based on the MCC scores in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Firstly, with the exception of ML-based labeling strategies trained using scan reports dating
back to 2018, the performance of labeling strategies using engineered features (i.e., Eng GS
and Eng Sel GS), significantly deteriorates on the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset. However,
labeling strategies trained with Eng Sel GS seem to have higher scores than their counterparts
trained with Eng GS, which is more evident against the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset, as seen
in Figure 4c versus Figure 5c. Secondly, in contrast, the MCC scores of labeling strategies
using the naive features appears to be more stable than their counterparts using engineered
features on both test datasets Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019. Similar to the case
with engineered features, the selected naive features Naive Sel GS enable the ML-based
labeling strategies to achieve higher MCC scores and maintain almost the same performance
over time regardless of when the labeling strategy was trained. Lastly, the performance
of both types of features seems to fluctuate over time, albeit not with the same rate or
severity. Using selected features seems to decrease or remove such fluctuations, especially
upon using the naive feature set. To understand the reasons that led to the manifestations
of such behaviors, we studied the structures of the random forests, which constitute Maat’s
ML-based labeling strategies, including the features they learn, their depth, and how they
classify apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports.
5.1.1 Features Learned by ML-based Labeling Strategies.
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Fig. 4. The labeling accuracies achieved by Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies Eng GS and Naive
GS trained with scan reports downloaded in between 2018 and June 21st , 2019 against apps in the
Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets over time.
Engineered Features. In Figure 6, we show an example of the decision trees trained using
engineered features based on VirusTotal scan reports of the training dataset AMD+GPlay
downloaded in 2018. We found that on this date, the decision trees within the train random
forests had almost identical structures and features, whether trained using the full or selected
corpus of the engineered feature set (i.e., Eng GS or Eng Sel GS). As seen in the figure, the
tree uses a mixture of the feature categories mentioned in Section 4.4, namely attributes
found in the apps’ scan reports (e.g., positives and total), features that indicate the age of an
app, and the verdicts of some VirusTotal scan reports (e.g., Babable and MAX). The tree’s
structure allows it to accurately classify Android apps in the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled
2019 datasets as follows. First, the left subtree classifies apps after checking the ratio of
positives to total attributes in the scan report, which allows it to cater to newly-developed
malicious apps. That is if the number of scanners is less than 2 (i.e., positives≤2.5) and
the total number of scanners in the scan reports is less than 24 (i.e., total≥24.5), the tree
assumes that the app is newly-developed yet around 9% of scanners deem it malicious, and
in turn labels the app as malicious. Otherwise, if the total number of scanners is more 24,
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Fig. 5. The labeling accuracies achieved by Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies Eng Sel GS and Naive
Sel GS trained with scan reports downloaded in between 2018 and June 21st , 2019 against apps in the
Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets over time.
the tree considers the app’s scan report to be mature (i.e., old app), yet only a small subset
of scanners deem it as malicious; in this case, the tree considers the positives to be false
positives and deems the app as benign. For our test datasets, we found that this subtree is
effective at classifying benign apps and minimizing false positives.
The tree’s right subtree checks the positives attribute again and labels apps as malicious if
more than 16 scanners deem an app malicious. This check helps identify old malicious apps
whose VirusTotal scan reports have matured to include values of positives higher than these
thresholds. As per November 8th , 2019, 99.65% of the malicious apps in the AMD+GPlay
dataset and 67% of those in the Hand-Labeled test dataset had positives values greater than
or equal to 16. However, this check does not help classify newly-developed malicious apps,
such as those in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset. In this case, the tree checks the verdict of
the Babable scanner. If the scanner deems an app malicious, it checks the verdict of another
scanner (i.e., TrendMicro’s MAX), and deems the app as malicious or benign according to this
scanner’s verdict. Effectively, the tree deems the app as malicious if two scanners, which
we found to be among the correct scanners for the AMD+GPlay and Hand-Labeled 2019
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Fig. 6. An example of a decision tree trained using grid search and all engineered features Eng GS
extracted from apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset in 2018.
Positives <= 2.5
entropy = 0.9953
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.54, 0.46]
class = Benign
Total <= 24.5
entropy = 0.002
samples = 54.0%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
True
Positives <= 15.5
entropy = 0.0028
samples = 46.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
entropy = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
entropy = 0.0
samples = 54.0%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
Babable <= 0.0
entropy = 0.1667
samples = 0.4%
value = [0.02, 0.98]
class = Malicious
entropy = 0.0
samples = 45.6%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
Age <= 7.3625
entropy = 0.0464
samples = 0.4%
value = [0.01, 0.99]
class = Malicious
MAX <= 0.5
entropy = 1.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.5, 0.5]
class = Benign
entropy = 0.0
samples = 0.3%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
entropy = 0.3712
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.07, 0.93]
class = Malicious
entropy = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
entropy = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
datasets in Section 4.2, deem the app malicious. If Babable finds the app benign, the tree
makes a final check about the age of the app being less than 7.3 years. However, this check
can be ignored because, regardless of the outcome, the tree assigns the app to the majority
class in this subtree, which is malicious.
For apps in our test datasets, we found that benign and malicious apps are labeled
according to the following decision paths. On the one hand, benign apps are classified
using the left subtree after satisfying the conditions that positives≤ 2 AND total ≥ 25. On
the other hand, malicious apps in the Hand-Labeled dataset were labeled malicious after
satisfying the conditions positives≥ 3 AND positives≥ 16 AND. However, given their novelty,
malicious apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets were labeled malicious after satisfying the
conditions positives≥ 3 AND Babable ≤ 0.0. Upon further investigation of the app’s scan
reports, we found that they are correctly classified whenever VirusTotal excludes Babable
from their scan reports. Furthermore, we found that the MAX scanner never detected any of
those apps. So, effectively, the apps were labeled as malicious if the check Babable == −1 is
true. Although this check is effective at labeling apps as malicious, it does not make sense
to label apps based on the absence of a scanner. This is an example of how VirusTotal’s
first limitation of including and excluding scanners in the scan reports of apps might impact
the way Maat’s ML-based trees are trained.
As for the performance of ML-based labeling strategies trained at different points in time,
we found that the main reason behind their underperformance is their shallowness. We found
that–whether they use all of the engineered features or a selected subset of them–all decision
trees in random forests trained between April 12th , 2019 and June 7th , 2019 employ only
one check making them shallow trees of depth one. With this depth, the tree is unable to
represent apps in the training dataset, which is apparent in the impurity of the leaf nodes.
For example, the left leaf node of Figure 7a’s second tree shows that 55% of the remaining
apps are benign, and 45% are malicious; apps will be labeled as benign because the majority
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ESET-NOD32 <= 0.5
gini = 0.5
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.5, 0.5]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0078
samples = 49.9%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 50.1%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
checks-gps <= 0.5
gini = 0.4998
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.49, 0.51]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.4943
samples = 87.4%
value = [0.55, 0.45]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.1066
samples = 12.6%
value = [0.06, 0.94]
class = Malicious
False
(a) Using all engineered features
NANO-Antivirus <= 0.5
gini = 0.5
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.5, 0.5]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0226
samples = 50.1%
value = [0.99, 0.01]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 49.9%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
Positives <= 5.0
gini = 0.4999
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.49, 0.51]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0
samples = 49.3%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 50.7%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
(b) Using selected engineered features
Fig. 7. Four randomly selected decision trees in the ML-based labeling strategies’ random forests trained
using grid search and engineered features Eng GS extracted from VirusTotal scan reports of apps in the
AMD+GPlay dataset downloaded on April 12th , 2019.
class, in this case, is benign. Later in this section, we explain why trees of depth one can be
trained using either type of features, viz. engineered and naive.
Despite being all of the depth one, some of the decision trees in these random forests are
more effective than others. For example, the decision tree in Figure 7 uses the verdict of
ESET-NOD32 to classify apps, which we showed in Section 4.2 to be a consistently correct
scanner.
Unfortunately, other decision trees trained on April 12th , 2019 using all engineered features
are subjective and fail on their own to represent patterns found in either the training dataset
AMD+GPlay or the test datasets. For example, the second decision tree (from the left)
relies on the checks-gps tag to label apps. This VirusTotal tag does not help discern the
malignancy of an app, especially since using the Global Positioning System (GPS) module
is common among malicious and benign apps alike.
Using a selected subset of the engineered features yields decision trees that are confident
about their labels, as indicated by the Gini values in the leaf nodes. Checks that did not
yield confident labels, such as the VirusTotal tags and the permissions requested by an app,
are excluded. The decision trees rely on either the verdicts of scanners that we found to be
correct in Section 4.2 on the AMD+GPlay dataset or scan report attributes such as positives
and total. While selecting features helped increase the performance of ML-based labeling
strategies using engineered features, they still failed to perform well on the Hand-Labeled
2019 dataset. The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, relying on the verdicts of only one
scanner makes the decision tree susceptible to VirusTotal’s dynamicity and the resulting
first limitation. Regardless of the correctness and stability of the scanner, it risks being
excluded from the scan reports of apps, which forces a decision tree to label all apps as
benign. This explains the fluctuation of Naive GS and Naive Sel GS on this dataset over
time. Secondly, the scan report attributes of positives and total are also susceptible to
VirusTotal’s dynamicity. More importantly, using threshold values such as five might suit
the older apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset, where the malicious apps have positives values
usually greater than ten and benign values of zero positives. However, such low values may
not generalize to newer apps where only a small subset of VirusTotal scanners might already
recognize their malignancies.
Naive Features. Using naive features and grid search Naive GS, we found that the
random forests that make up the ML-based labeling strategies had three different structures
and depths. The random forest trained using this type of features on 2018 had depths of ten.
For readability, in Figure 6, we show parts of an example decision tree that belongs to this
random forest. The decision tree in the figure checks the verdicts of different VirusTotal
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Qihoo-360 <= 0.5
gini = 0.4969
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.54, 0.46]
class = Benign
Cyren <= 0.5
gini = 0.3196
samples = 67.5%
value = [0.8, 0.2]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 32.5%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
Fortinet <= 0.5
gini = 0.0311
samples = 54.8%
value = [0.98, 0.02]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 12.6%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
Jiangmin <= -0.5
gini = 0.0014
samples = 54.0%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.8%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
VIPRE <= -0.5
gini = 0.3091
samples = 0.2%
value = [0.81, 0.19]
class = Benign
Kingsoft <= -0.5
gini = 0.0002
samples = 53.8%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
McAfee-GW-Edition <= -0.5
gini = 0.4132
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.29, 0.71]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.1%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
(...) (...)
GData <= -0.5
gini = 0.001
samples = 3.8%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
Ikarus <= 0.5
gini = 0.0001
samples = 50.1%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
(...) (...) (...) (...)
(a) Using all naive features
CAT-QuickHeal <= 0.5
gini = 0.4972
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.54, 0.46]
class = Benign
Avira <= 0.5
gini = 0.0114
samples = 54.2%
value = [0.99, 0.01]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 45.8%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
DrWeb <= 0.5
gini = 0.0013
samples = 54.0%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.3%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
Trustlook <= 0.5
gini = 0.0003
samples = 53.9%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0001
samples = 53.9%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
(b) Using selected naive features
Fig. 8. Two decision trees trained using grid search and naive features Naive GS and Naive Sel GS
extracted from apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset in 2018.
scanners, some of which we found to be correct, such as Fortinet and Ikarus, and others
that we found to be hesitant, such as Cyren. However, checking the verdicts of these different
scanners yield pure leaf nodes that are confident about the class of an app (i.e., Gini index of
zero). Although this random forest had decent and stable MCC scores on both test datasets,
one can notice the presence of checks similar to the Babable example with engineered features,
namely checks that rely on the absence of a scanner’s verdict. For example, the fourth node
and its two child nodes check whether the verdicts of the scanners Jiangmin, VIPRE, and
Kingsoft do not exist in the scan report being processed.
This type of checks does not exist in decision trees trained using selected naive features.
As seen in Figure 8b, decision trees in the Naive Sel GS random forests had depths of
four and their structures were different from the ones trained with all naive features in
two aspects. First, they relied on the verdicts of correct scanners. That is we did not find
any decision trees that rely on the verdicts of VirusTotal scanners, such as GData, Alibaba,
or Kingsoft. Second, they relied on the verdicts of scanners that are included in the scan
reports and checked whether each scanner deemed an app as malicious or benign rather than
whether the scanner’s verdicts were absent from the scan report. The performance of Naive
Sel GS ML-based labeling strategies mimicked that of their Naive GS counterparts on the
Hand-Labeled dataset. However, on the newer Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset, that performance
decreases in terms of MCC scores by about 0.1, albeit remaining stable.
The depth of four does not seem to hinder the performance of ML-based labeling strategies
using naive features. As seen in Figure 9, using an average depth of four, the labeling
strategies that used both all and selected naive features had MCC scores that (a) were
stable over time, and (b) matched and in some cases outperformed those of threshold-based
labeling strategies using the current optimal threshold. The primary difference between
random forests trained using Naive GS and Naive Sel GS was the utilization of correct and
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AegisLab <= 0.5
gini = 0.4971
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.54, 0.46]
class = Benign
Avast-Mobile <= 0.5
gini = 0.44
samples = 80.0%
value = [0.67, 0.33]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 20.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
MAX <= 0.5
gini = 0.357
samples = 70.3%
value = [0.77, 0.23]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 9.8%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
Sophos <= 0.5
gini = 0.0135
samples = 54.2%
value = [0.99, 0.01]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 16.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.001
samples = 53.9%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.4%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
(a) Using all naive features
CAT-QuickHeal <= 0.5
gini = 0.4999
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.49, 0.51]
class = Malicious
NANO-Antivirus <= 0.5
gini = 0.0081
samples = 49.8%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 50.2%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
ESET-NOD32 <= 0.5
gini = 0.0006
samples = 49.6%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.2%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
MAX <= 0.5
gini = 0.0002
samples = 49.6%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0
samples = 49.6%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
(b) Using selected naive features
Fig. 9. Two randomly selected decision trees in the ML-based labeling strategies’ random forests trained
using grid search and naive features Naive Sel GS extracted from VirusTotal scan reports of apps in
the AMD+GPlay dataset downloaded on April 12th , 2019
stable VirusTotal scanners. On the one hand, Naive GS decision trees relied on the verdicts
of a mixture of correct scanners (e.g., Sophos, ESET-NOD32, and NANO-Antivirus) and other
less reliable scanners to label apps. On the other hand, Naive Sel GS exclusively relied
on the verdicts of correct and stable scanners, as identified in Section 4. In both cases, we
noticed that the deeper the decision trees grow, the lower the number of malicious apps that
need to be labeled. For example, in both decision trees in Figure 9, by the time the last
check is performed, less than 1% of the malicious apps remain to be classified. So, it seems
that the checks employed by the decision trees attempt to identify malicious apps first, and
the remaining apps are being classified as benign.
As for the performance of both types of ML-based labeling strategies on the test datasets,
we noticed that labeling strategies using Naive Sel GS had fewer fluctuations in MCC
scores over time on both datasets that its Naive GS counterpart. Moreover, the mediocre
performance of ML-based labeling strategies trained using Naive GS on April 26th , 2019
increases upon using selected naive features. The reason for that we found is that using
selected naive features (i.e., Naive Sel GS), the depth of the random forests increases
from one to four to resemble the structure of other Naive Sel GS random forests. We
visualize the structure of Naive GS and Naive Sel GS ML-based labeling strategies trained
on this date in Figure 10. On the one hand, random forests trained using all naive features
(seen in Figure 10a) result into decision trees that employ only one check of different
VirusTotal scanners. The more reliable and correct the scanner is (e.g., NANO-Antivirus or
SymantecMobileInsight), the more confident are the labeling decisions. Decision trees that
rely on the verdicts of scanners, such as Baidu, are likely to yield unconfident labels. On
the other hand, using selected naive features yields random forests with decision trees of an
average length of four, which rely on the verdicts of four scanners, most of which we found
to be correct and stable.
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Baidu <= -0.5
gini = 0.5
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.5, 0.5]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 1.8%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.4999
samples = 98.2%
value = [0.49, 0.51]
class = Malicious
False
SymantecMobileInsight <= 0.5
gini = 0.5
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.5, 0.5]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0063
samples = 50.6%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 49.4%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
(a) Using all naive features
NANO-Antivirus <= 0.5
gini = 0.5
samples = 100.0%
value = [0.5, 0.5]
class = Benign
CAT-QuickHeal <= 0.5
gini = 0.023
samples = 51.0%
value = [0.99, 0.01]
class = Benign
True
gini = 0.0
samples = 49.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
False
Trustlook <= 0.5
gini = 0.0003
samples = 50.4%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.6%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
Ikarus <= 0.5
gini = 0.0001
samples = 50.4%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
gini = 0.0
samples = 50.4%
value = [1.0, 0.0]
class = Benign
gini = 0.0
samples = 0.0%
value = [0.0, 1.0]
class = Malicious
(b) Using selected naive features
Fig. 10. Three randomly selected decision trees in the ML-based labeling strategies’ random forests
trained using grid search and naive features extracted from VirusTotal scan reports of apps in the
AMD+GPlay dataset downloaded on April 26th , 2019. The two trees on the left were trained using all
naive features Naive GS and the tree on the right was trained using selected naive features Naive Sel
GS.
So, we can sum up the results of this section as follows. First, we found that naive features
train ML-based labeling strategies have higher and more stable MCC scores on both test
datasets than their counterparts trained using engineered features. Second, for both types of
features, we found that selecting the most informative features boosts the labeling accuracies
of ML-based labeling strategies and relatively smoothens the fluctuations of their MCC
scores over time. Third, in associating the labeling accuracies with the structure of decision
trees in the random forests constituting ML-based labeling strategies, we found that decision
trees that rely on the verdicts of between three and four VirusTotal scanners, which we
found to be correct and stable on the training dataset AMD+GPlay, yields the best and most
stable MCC scores. In the next section, we attempt to explain what controls the structure
of the trained random forests and the role that VirusTotal’s dynamicity plays in this.
5.1.2 Sensitivity to VirusTotal’s Dynamicity. In Section 4.1, we mentioned that we use the
technique of grid search to find the hyperparameters that yield the most accurate random
forests that constitute Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies. One of those hyperparameters
controls the maximum depth each decision tree in the random forest is allowed to grow (i.e.,
max_depth). We varied the value of max_depth to be one, four, ten, and None, and allowed
the technique of grid to identify the value that yields the best validation accuracy (T P+T NP+N )
achieved using the technique of cross-validation, which we set to be ten-fold. In our case, this
accuracy is calculated by splitting the scan reports of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset into
ten folds, train the random forests using nine of those, and using the remaining one-tenth as
validation dataset. The final validation accuracy is an average of all ten accuracies achieved
on the ten validation datasets.
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We found that the validation accuracies achieved by random forests of different depths
are very close to one another. For example, for Naive GS ML-based labeling strategies
trained on April 26th , 2019, we found that the validation accuracies achieved by random
forests with max_depth values of one, four, ten, and None were 1.0, 0.9999794703346335,
0.9999794703346335, and 0.9999589490951507, respectively. Based on those values and despite
the insignificant difference in validation accuracies, the grid search algorithm suggested the
random forests with max_depth of one as the best random forest. So, what causes this small
difference? The difference between both values is 0.00002053. This means that out of one
tenth of the total number of apps in the AMD+GPlay datasets (i.e., 48, 715 × 0.1 = 4, 871),
an average of 0.10 (i.e., 4, 871 × 0.00002053 = 0.100011895) apps gets misclassified in the
validation dataset. Since this value is an average, we can assume that at some validation
folds, a few apps out of 4,871 are misclassified.
In this case of Naive GS ML-based labeling strategies, since they rely on the verdicts given
by VirusTotal scanners, the frequent change in the verdicts of scanners (i.e., VirusTotal’s
first limitation), is expected to have an impact on the feature vectors used to train the
labeling strategies’ random forests. In fact, we found that between April 12th , 2019, and
April 26th , 2019 only 15% of the apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset had the exact same
verdicts. Furthermore, between these two dates, almost 85% of the apps had at least one
verdict change, 51.65% hat at least two verdicts change, and 23.4% had at least three verdicts
change. Examining these differences between all other training dates (i.e., between 2018
and June 21st , 2019), yielded very similar percentages. Nonetheless, these percentages do
not reveal which verdicts have been changed. So, the likely scenario on April 26th , 2019
is that the verdicts in the VirusTotal scan reports of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset
changed in a manner that gave a slight edge to random forests with max_depth of one
enough to make them be chosen as the best random forests. In that sense, the dynamicity of
VirusTotal can impact the performance of Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies’ random
forests yielding ones with shallow decision trees that perform well on the training dataset,
yet fail to generalize to test datasets.
Another aspect of the ML-based labeling strategies’ sensitivity to VirusTotal’s dynamicity
is related to the platform’s third limitation, namely that it sometimes utilizes inadequate
scanners and versions of scanners that are not designed to cater to Android malware. In
particular, this limitation affected Naive Sel GS, which relies on the verdicts of scanners to
label apps. As seen in Section 4.2, some scanners, such as BitDefender, had better labeling
accuracy in 2018 before their versions were altered by VirusTotal. Consequently, Naive
Sel GS labeling strategies trained using 2018 versions of apps in the AMD+GPlay dataset
might include scanners that were correct and stable back then (e.g., Trustlook and Avira).
These scanners ceased to be correct and stable and, hence, were not able to help label apps
accurately in the test datasets according to their scan reports downloaded at different points
in time in 2019.
5.2 Enhancing Detection Methods
The second criterion we use to evaluate the applicability of Maat’s ML-based labeling
strategies is their ability to contribute to training more effective ML-based detection methods.
In Section 1, we discussed that inaccurate labeling might have a negative impact on the
detection performance on potentially effective detection methods. By addressing this issue of
labeling accuracy, we can contribute to helping the research community focus on developing
effective detection methods rather than being consumed by devising labeling strategies that
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accurately label apps in their training datasets. Our main hypothesis in this section is that
accurate labeling should, in turn, lead to more effective detection of out-of-sample apps. So,
since Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies managed to accurately label apps in the test
datasets over a period of time, we hypothesize that they can accurately label apps in the
AndroZoo dataset and lead to training ML-based detection methods that accurately label
apps in those test datasets, viz. Hand-Labeled, and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets.
We focus on ML-based detection methods given their popularity within the academic
community [5, 27, 42, 43, 49]. In essence, we train different ML classifiers using static features
extracted from the AndroZoo dataset, which depict information about the apps’ components
[34, 35], the permissions they request [4, 48], the API calls found in their codebases [30, 51],
and the compilers used to compile them [41]. The feature vectors are then labeled using
different threshold-based and ML-based labeling strategies. We test the detection abilities of
such classifiers by assessing their ability to label apps in the Hand-Labeled, and Hand-Labeled
2019 datasets correctly. For readability, we use the shorter term classifier was labeled instead
of classifier whose feature vectors were labeled.
There is a plethora of approaches to using static features and ML algorithms to detect
Android malware. We utilize a detection method that is renowned in the research community
and has been used by different researchers as a benchmark [8], namely Drebin [4]. The
Drebin approach comprises three components: a linear support vector machine LinearSVC
to classify apps, a thorough set of static features extracted from Android apps that spans
all app components, permissions, URL’s, etc., and the drebin labeling strategy. Using an
implementation of Drebin’s feature extraction algorithm, we extracted a total of 71,260
features from apps in the AndroZoo, Hand-Labeled, Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets. In addition
to Drebin, we use the following classifiers: K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [33], Random Forest
(RF) [34], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [4], and Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB)11 [34].
Given that the KNN and RF classifiers can have different values for their hyperparameters,
we used the technique of grid search to identify the classifiers that yielded the best validation
accuracies and used them as representatives of those classifiers. We also varied the values
of the primary hyperparameters of the KNN and RF classifiers as follows; we varied the
number of nearest neighbors to consider by the KNN classifier to K = {11, 26, 51, 101} and
the number of decisions trees in the random forest to {25, 50, 75, 100}. Consequently, we
refer to these to classifiers as KNN and RF. To train these classifiers, we statically extracted
numerical features from the APK archives of apps in the AndroZoo, which depict information
about the apps’ components [34, 35], the permissions they request [4, 48], the API calls
found in their codebases [30, 51], and the compilers used to compile them [41].
The labeling strategies we consider in this experiment are the conventional threshold-based
strategies of vt≥1, vt≥4, vt≥10, vt≥50%, and drebin, threshold-based labeling strategies
that use threshold brute-forced using at each point in time, threshold-based labeling strategies
that use the best threshold at each point in time, and Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies
that had the highest MCC scores in the previous experiment, namely Naive GS and Naive
Sel GS. In assessing the performance of different ML-based detection methods, we are not
concerned with absolute values that indicate the quality of the classifier and the features it
is trained with. Instead, we are interested in their performance with respect to one another.
Given that the main difference between such classifiers is that their training feature vectors
11Gaussian naive Bayes classifiers assume that features have a Gaussian distribution. We argue that the
static features we extract from the apps indeed follow such distribution. For example, while a small number
of apps request either a very small or a considerable amount of requests, the majority of apps request an
adequate amount (e.g., in the lower tens).
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Fig. 11. The MCC scores achieved by the Drebin classifiers labeled using different threshold-/ML-based
labeling strategies against the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset between July 5th , 2019
and November 8th , 2019.
were labeled using different labeling strategies, this experiment is concerned with verifying
the hypothesis of more accurate labeling leads to better detection.
In Figure 11 we plot the classification performance of different Drebin classifiers against
apps in the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets in terms of MCC score. The
feature vectors used to train each of those classifiers have been labeled using a different
labeling strategy. Given that the performances of different classifiers are intertwined, we
tabulate their MCC scores in Table 3 for better readability. Studying these performances,
we made the following observations.
The first observation we made was that the performance of Drebin classifiers is better
on the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset than on the older Hand-Labeled dataset. The reason
behind this is that apps in the AndroZoo dataset were developed between 2018 and 2019. So,
features extracted from these apps are expected to be similar to apps in the Hand-Labeled
2019 dataset than to those in the Hand-Labeled dataset, especially since the Drebin feature
set is designed to identify similarity in the components and features utilized by the Android
apps in the training dataset. This proximity in feature space helps Drebin’s Linear Support
Vector Machine (SVC) classifier identify patterns shared by malicious and benign apps
better.
Secondly, we found that using best threshold at each point on time along with Maat’s
ML-based labeling strategies usually helps the Drebin classifier achieve better MCC scores
than threshold-based labeling strategies that use fixed thresholds over time (e.g., vt≥1,
vt≥10, and vt≥50%). Moreover, the average MCC scores of Drebin classifiers labeled using
Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies is higher than that of classifiers labeled using the best
thresholds at each scan date. This observation coincides with our hypothesis that accurate
labeling strategies, by and large, contribute to training more effective ML-based detection
methods. However, we noticed a number of exceptions that contradict this hypothesis. For
example, the Naive GS ML-based labeling strategies trained in 2018 and the Naive GS
strategies trained on April 12th , 2019 had almost the same labeling accuracy against apps
in the Hand-Labeled dataset. Despite this similarity, the Drebin classifiers labeled using the
latter strategy noticeably underperforms in comparison to the former one. This behavior
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Table 3. Detailed view of the MCC scores achieved by the Drebin classifiers labeled using different
threshold-/ML-based labeling strategies against the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset
between July 5th , 2019 and November 8th , 2019.
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Brute-forced Thresholds 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
Best Thresholds 0.28 0.34 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.24 0.22 0.50 0.56 0.50
vt≥1 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.35 0.25 0.31 0.31
vt≥4 0.26 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.38 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.39 0.36
vt≥10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
vt≥50% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
drebin 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.05
Naive GS 2018 0.59 0.41 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.48 0.51 0.36 0.55 0.55
Naive GS 2019-04-12 0.27 0.29 0.39 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.38 0.33 0.49 0.26
Naive Sel GS 2018 0.54 0.51 0.60 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.72 0.38 0.55 0.55
Naive Sel GS 2019-04-12 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.58 0.47
Hand-Labeled 2019
Brute-forced Thresholds 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.19 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.53 0.43
Best Thresholds 0.73 0.67 0.73 0.80 0.67 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.73 0.76
vt≥1 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.25 0.40 0.37
vt≥4 0.73 0.66 0.80 0.73 0.76 0.70 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.73
vt≥10 0.53 0.23 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.27 0.48 0.48
vt≥50% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
drebin 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.19
Naive GS 2018 0.84 0.76 0.73 0.63 0.80 0.76 0.70 0.67 0.80 0.78
Naive GS 2019-04-12 0.84 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.71 0.67 0.80 0.82
Naive Sel GS 2018 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.62
Naive Sel GS 2019-04-12 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.80 0.73 0.84
switches on the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset: the performance of Drebin classifiers labeled
using Naive GS 2018 almost mimics that of those labeled using Naive GS trained on April
12th , 2019, despite the former being less able to label apps in this dataset accurately.
The third observation depicts another counter-example to the hypothesis that related
accurate labeling to effective detection. Although it falls within the ranges of best thresholds
identified at each scan date, using a threshold of four VirusTotal scanners to label the
Drebin classifier (i.e., using vt≥4), yields scores that do not mimic the performance of the
Drebin classifiers using the current best thresholds. For example, while using any threshold
between three and six on July 5th , 2019 resulted in the same MCC scores against apps in
the Hand-Labeled dataset, on the same scan date and using the same test datasets, training
a Drebin classifier using a threshold of three scanners yields a different MCC score than a
classifier using a threshold of four scanners, namely 0.28 and 0.26, respectively.
In general, we noticed that MCC score of each Drebin classifier differs depending on the
utilized labeling strategy and the scan date of the VirusTotal scan reports this strategy
uses to label apps. In addition to these two factors, we noticed that the utilized classifier
also impacts these scores. Figure 12 shows the MCC scores achieved by the KNN, RF, and
GNB classifiers against the same test datasets using the same labeling strategies. Similar to
the Drebin classifier, the MCC scores achieved by these three classifiers show that Maat’s
ML-based labeling strategies contribute to training more effective detection methods than
their threshold-based counterparts, in spite of using a different set of features to represent
the apps in the training and test datasets. However, unlike the Drebin classifier, the MCC
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Fig. 12. The MCC scores achieved by the KNN, RF, and GNB classifiers labeled using different threshold-
/ML-based labeling strategies against the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset between July
5th , 2019 and November 8th , 2019.
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scores of the KNN, RF, and GNB classifiers seem to be stable across different scan dates,
especially on the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset. The values of these scores seem to differ from
one classifier to another. On the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset, for instance, the average MCC
scores of the KNN, RF, and GNB classifiers were 0.64, 0.89, and 0.43, respectively. So, it
seems that the features used to represent apps in the training dataset and the type of ML
classifier also impact the performance of a detection method.
To sum up, we found that accurately labeling apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports
does not guarantee training more effective detection methods. Other factors, such as the
utilized feature set and the date on which the training and test apps were scanned by
VirusTotal also impact the effectiveness of such methods.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the insights we gained from our experiments, the limitations of
our work, and how we (plan to) address them.
Optimally Using VirusTotal To Label Apps. In Section 1, we mentioned that the
main objective of this paper is to provide the research community with insights about how
to best interpret the raw information given by VirusTotal to accurately label Android apps.
So, we studied the performance of two types of labeling strategies, viz. threshold-based
labeling strategies and a representative of scanner-based labeling strategies that relies on ML
algorithms trained by our frameworkMaat. Threshold-based labeling strategies that rely on
fixed thresholds suffer from two problems. First, they are subjective as their thresholds reflect
the subjectivity of defining apps as malicious in terms of the number of scanners deeming
it as such. Second, they are susceptible to the dynamicity of VirusTotal and its frequent
manipulation of scan reports of apps, especially newly-developed ones. So, the values of
thresholds used by this type of labeling strategies have to be frequently updated to cope
with the online platform’s dynamicity, rather than being fixed and used for extended periods
of time, which can be an infeasible process. We implemented Maat to train ML-based
labeling strategies that are meant to mitigate the aforementioned two problems facing
their threshold-based counterparts. While they showed slight sensitivity to VirusTotal’s
dynamicity, Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies exhibited steady labeling accuracies over
time that mimic that of threshold-based labeling strategies that use the best thresholds at
every point in time. Since they are trained at one point in time yet are able to maintain
decent labeling accuracies and contribute to more effective ML-based detection methods, such
ML-based labeling strategies have the potential to replace or complement threshold-based
labeling strategies. So, despite being fast and intuitive, conventional threshold-based labeling
strategies that rely on a fixed threshold over time are not able to cope with VirusTotal’s
dynamicity. Instead, the current threshold values that yield the best labeling accuracies
have to be re-calculated on a frequent basis. The easiest method to identify those values
is to measure the accuracy of thresholds between one and 60 against a diverse dataset of
pre-labeled Android apps. While this process seems to be theoretically feasible, it requires
the satisfaction of different conditions that might be cumbersome or even infeasible. The
ability of Maat’s to automatically train ML-based labeling strategies that maintain labeling
accuracies that match those of the best possible threshold-based labeling strategies over
time suggests that they can use utilized to complement or replace threshold-based strategies
altogether.
The Role of Accurate Labeling in Malware Detection. We argued in Section 1
that accurate labeling of apps is fundamental to training and evaluating effective malware
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detection methods. So, our main hypothesis vis-à-vis labeling is that the more accurate the
apps are being labeled, the more effective the malware detection methods that use them as
training apps. In Section 5.2, we found that Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies that use
the verdicts of VirusTotal scanners to label apps (i.e., naive features), and threshold-based
labeling strategies that use the best current thresholds contribute to training ML-based
detection methods that are more effective than those labeled using conventional threshold-
based strategies that rely on fixed thresholds (e.g., vt≥1 or vt≥50%). Nevertheless, we did not
find evidence that accurate labeling of feature vectors is synonymous with better detection
accuracy. That is, in some cases, labeling strategies that performed worse at labeling apps
based on their VirusTotal scan reports contributed to training ML-based detection methods
that perform better than other labeling strategies that performed better at labeling apps. We
argue that such occasional discrepancies are due to the performance of ML-based detection
methods being subject to the chosen classifier and the utilized features extracted from the
training apps. In this context, we found that the more accurate a labeling strategy is at
labeling apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports, the more likely it is going to contribute
to training more effective ML-based detection methods. The type of features extracted from
malicious and benign apps and the technique adopted by the chosen ML classifier dictate
how the classifier will segregate the feature vectors of both types of apps. The position in
the dimensional space of out-of-sample feature vectors relative to the decision boundary
learned by the ML classifier also plays a vital role in the classifier’s performance against test
datasets. These issues might have contributed to the few exceptions to the aforementioned
general rule.
VirusTotal’s Limitations. Despite calls within the research community to replace
VirusTotal with a more reliable alternative, the online platform continues to be utilized
by researchers to label apps in the datasets they use to evaluate their malware detection
methods. These calls for replacement stem from the common knowledge that platforms, such
as VirusTotal, suffer from some drawbacks. However, these drawbacks and their impact on
the process of labeling apps were neither thoroughly discussed nor demonstrated. Throughout
this paper, we discussed some of those limitations and their impacts on identifying the set of
correct scanners, estimating the time it takes scan reports to stabilize, and the performance of
different labeling strategies. Using the insights we gained from our measurements and exper-
iments, we identified the following limitations of VirusTotal that jeopardizes its usefulness.
Firstly, the platform does not automatically re-scan apps and relies on manually re-scanning
apps either via its web-interface or via remote API requests. Secondly, the platform uses
scanners or versions of scanners that are not suitable to detect Android malware. Thirdly,
for reasons unknown to us, the platform changes the set of scanners it uses to scan the
same apps over time, which undermines the sustainability of labeling strategies, such as
threshold-based ones. Lastly, the platform does not grant access to the history of scans,
effectively preventing researchers from studying the performance of scanners over extended
periods of time.
6.1 Limitations and Threats to Validity
Partial Reliance on VirusTotal’s Ground Truths. To label apps in the AMD+GPlay
dataset, we relied on the labels generated by Wei et al. to label apps in the AMD dataset,
which combined filtration of malicious using the vt≥50% labeling strategy and manual
analysis to accurately label apps in the dataset as malicious. We also used the VirusTotal
scan reports of apps in the GPlay dataset, which were downloaded from the well-vetted
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Google Play store, to deem them as benign according to the criterion positives==0 between
2018 and September 27th , 2019. The threat to validity in this case is whether those measures
we took to ensure the accuracy of the labels in this dataset were not enough. Since we rely
on the AMD+GPlay dataset to train Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies, inaccuracies in
the labels of those apps threatens to undermine the credibility of our findings. To ensure the
credibility of our results, we plan on manually-labeling as many Android apps as possible,
use them to train Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies, and compare the results we achieve
with the results in this paper. Needless to say, manually analyzing thousands of apps is a
lengthy process.
Confinement to Used Datasets and Scan Reports. The results we recorded and
discussed in this paper are confined to the datasets that we used. So, the threat to validity,
in this case, is whether the same conclusions we drew can be reached upon using other
datasets (e.g., that Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies are more consistent that their
threshold-based counterparts). In this paper, we attempted to assess the reproducibility of
our results. However, the experiments were conducted on the same datasets, and the time
period between the two sets of experiments was less than two months. So, in the future, we
plan to run our measurements and experiments against different datasets to verify whether
our results are reproducible on other datasets.
Access to older scan reports. The results we present in this paper, especially those
vis-à-vis the correctness and stability of VirusTotal scanners, were drawn from scan reports
gathered between 2018 and November 8th , 2019 because access to older scan reports is only
available under commercial licenses. So, we are not able to capture the complete history
of apps in the AMD+GPlay and how they evolved. In Section 4.2, we demonstrated that
the time period during which the VirusTotal scan reports were gathered alters the set of
correct scanners. On the one hand, this might affect the engineered features Maat extracts
from the scan reports, which we found to be less informative that their naive counterparts.
On the other hand, training ML-based labeling strategies using naive features relies on
the latest scan reports of apps in Maat’s training dataset (i.e., September 27th , 2019 and
November 8th , 2019). Furthermore, apps in the test datasets are also labeled according to
their latest scan reports. So, while lack of access to older scan report might slightly change
the results of our measurements in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, it does not impact our
findings in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, viz. that Maat ML-based labeling strategies are
more consistently accurate than their threshold-based counterparts.
Generalization to other detection methods. To further motivate the significance of
our work, we showed that accurate labeling generally enhances the performance of ML-based
detection methods trained using static features. This begs the question of whether we can
replicate the same results if we utilize different features and/or different classifiers. The
most appropriate method to verify this hypothesis is to conduct the same experiments using
different types of features and classifiers in pursuit of counter-examples. However, there is a
plethora of work in this area that spans a multitude of approaches to malware analysis and
detection [43], which indeed cannot be comprehensively covered in this work. So, we plan to
conduct more experiments using different types of features (e.g., dynamic features), and/or
classifiers to further solidify our findings.
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7 RELATED WORK
Studying VirusTotal. Given the significant role it plays in malware analysis and detection
process, the research community has studied different aspects of VirusTotal and its scanners.
In [25], Mohaisen et al. inspected the relative performance of VirusTotal scanners on a small
sample of manually-inspected and labeled Windows executables. The authors introduced four
criteria, called correctness, completeness, coverage, and consistency, to assess the labeling
capabilities of VirusTotal scanners and demonstrated the danger of relying on VirusTotal
scanners that do not meet such criteria. The main objective of this study is, therefore, to
shed light on the inconsistencies among VirusTotal scanners on a small dataset. In [24],
Mohaisen and Alrawi built on their previous study and attempted to assess the detection
rate, the correctness of reported labels, and the consistency of detection of VirusTotal
scanners according to the aforementioned four criteria. They showed that in order to obtain
complete and correct (i.e., in comparison to ground truth) labels from VirusTotal, one needs
to utilize multiple independent scanners instead of hinging on one or a few of them. Similarly,
within the domain of Android malware, Hurier et al. studied the scan reports of VirusTotal
scanners to identify the lack of consistency in labels assigned to the same app by different
scanners and proposed metrics to quantitatively describe such inconsistencies [10]. More
recently, Peng et al. [28] showed that VirusTotal scanners exhibit similar inconsistencies
upon deeming Uniform Resource Locator (URL) as malicious and benign. The authors
also showed that some VirusTotal scanners are more correct than others, which requires a
strategy to label such URLs that does not treat all scanners equally. In Section 4, we discussed
how our method Maat analyzes VirusTotal scan reports to identify correct and stable
scanners as part of extracting engineered features from such reports. This process indeed
builds on the insights in [10, 24, 25]. In fact, we utilize the correctness score introduced in [25]
to assess the correctness of VirusTotal scanners over time. However, our work is different
from the aforementioned work in terms of objectives. While the objective of [10, 24, 25, 28] is
to shed light on the dynamicity of VirusTotal, our work attempts to take a step further by
providing the research community by explaining the potential reasons behind VirusTotal’s
dynamicity and how they impact conventional threshold-based labeling strategies.
Label Unification. The lack of universal standards to label and name malicious apps
allows different antiviral firms to give different labels to the same malicious app [16, 21]. For ex-
ample, the same malware can have the labels Worm:W32/Downadup.gen!A, Net-Worm.Win32.Kido.cp,
W32/ Conficker.worm.gen.a, Worm:Win32/Conficker.gen!B, Worm-Win32/Conficker.gen!A,
which all share the case insensitive substring worm [16]. So, considering the problem to
be that of string manipulation, one of the main objectives of academic research has been
to devise methods to unify those strings into one that still represents the malware type
and family of a malicious app. In [29], Perdisci et al. did not implement a method to unify
different antiviral labels, rather an automated approach, VAMO, that assesses methods that
clusters similar labels together prior to unifying them. This method can help eliminate noisy
labels, which is a prerequisite for accurate unification of labels. Wang et al. also studied
the malware naming discrepancies via analyzing the scan results in [46], and identified
two types of such discrepancies, viz. syntactic and semantic. The authors implemented an
approach, Latin, that considers these two types of discrepancies towards devising a consensus
classification of antiviral labels that can be used to look up information about malicious
apps in repositories such as Anubis. The work in [29] and [46] did not present tools that
output unified labels. In [40], Sebastian et al. presented a fully-automatic, cross-platform
tool, AVCLASS, that examines different labels given to the same app by different scanners,
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and returns the most likely family name that such app should assume. Similarly, Hurier et
al. developed a tool, Euphony, that mines labels, analyzes the associations between them,
and attempts to unify them into common family groups [11]. In this paper, we attempt to
devise one label for malicious apps based on their VirusTotal scan reports, which include
multiple labels given by different antiviral scanners. However, we do not attempt to give
a label that indicates the malware family or type of apps. Instead, we attempt to devise
labels that indicate whether an app is malicious or benign (i.e., a label that discerns the
malignancy of the app).
Discerning Malignancy. A more abstract form of labeling apps is to label them as
malicious or benign. Apart from threshold-based labeling strategies, researchers have devised
more sophisticated labeling strategies, primarily based on ML. In [15], Kantchelian et al. used
the VirusTotal scan reports of around 280K binaries to build two ML-based techniques to
aggregate the results of multiple scanners into a single ground-truth label for every binary. In
the first technique, Kantchelian et al. assume that the ground truth of an app (i.e., malicious
or benign), is unknown or hidden, making the problem of estimating this ground truth is that
of unsupervised learning. Furthermore, they assumed that the verdicts of more consistent, less
erratic scanners are more likely to be correlated with the correct, hidden ground truth than
more erratic scanners. Thus, more consistent scanners should have larger weights associated
with their verdicts. To estimate those weights and, hence, devise an unsupervised ML-based
labeling strategy, the authors used an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm based on
a Bayesian model to estimate those models. The second technique devised by Kantchelian et
al. is a supervised one based on regularized logistic regression. However, the authors did not
describe the nature of the features they use to train such an algorithm. So, we assume that
they relied on the verdicts of antiviral scanners in a manner similar to the naive features we
extracted from VirusTotal scan reports, as discussed in Section 4. To devise an automated
method to label apps based on different verdicts given by antiviral scanners, Sachdeva et al.
[30] performed measurements to determine the most correct VirusTotal scanners using scan
reports of a total of 5K malicious and benign apps. Using this information, they assign a
weight to each scanner that they use to calculate a malignancy score for apps based on their
VirusTotal scan reports. Depending on manually-defined thresholds, the authors use this
score to assign a confidence level of Safe, Suspicious, or Highly Suspicious to test apps. The
main difference between our work and [15] and [30] is actionability. That is to say, despite
reporting decent labeling accuracies, both efforts did not evaluate whether the newly-devised
labeling method can help build effective detection methods and left that for future work:
"Improved training labels, as obtained by the techniques presented in this paper, should
result in an improved malware detector." [15]. In this paper, however, we attempted to
evaluate the applicability of our method by examining the classification accuracies detection
methods can achieve using labels predicted by the most accurate threshold-/ML-based
labeling strategies.
8 CONCLUSION
The infeasibility of manually analyzing and labeling Android apps forces the research
community to use VirusTotal scan reports to label those apps, despite proving to be a
dynamic online platform. We argue that the solution to VirusTotal’s dynamicity is to replace
it with a more stable platform. However, until either VirusTotal addresses its limitations
or an alternative platform is developed and tested, the research community is expected to
use VirusTotal despite its known limitations. So, the main objective of this paper was to
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: July 2020.
35
provide insights to the research community about how optimally utilize VirusTotal to scan
apps based on their scan reports.
We started by discussing threshold-based labeling strategies that are widely-adopted by
researchers, and showed their sensitivity to VirusTotal’s dynamicity, which forces researchers
to identify the optimal thresholds to use every time they wish to label their apps. To tackle
the limitations of threshold-based labeling strategies and as a step towards standardizing
the utilization of VirusTotal scan reports, we developed a method, Maat, that automates
the process of analyzing VirusTotal scan reports gathered over a period of time to devise
ML-based labeling strategies that accurately label apps and, in turn, contribute to more
effective malware detection. To train such ML-based strategies, we analyzed the VirusTotal
scan reports of about 53K Android apps gathered between 2018 and November 8th , 2019 in
pursuit of informative features to extract from such reports.
During this process, we addressed two issues of interest to the research community, finding
the sets of correct and stable VirusTotal scanners over a period of time. In Section 4.2, we
showed that there is no universal set of VirusTotal scanners that will always accurately
label apps as malicious and benign regardless to the utilized dataset or scan reports. In
contrast, we found that the set of correct scanners changes from one dataset to another
depending on (a) its composition of malicious and benign apps, and (b) the period during
which the apps’ scan reports were gathered. We also found that VirusTotal, presumably
upon request from the antiviral software companies themselves, replaces adequate versions
of some scanners with ones that may not be suitable to detect Android malware, as with the
case of BitDefender. As for the stability of scanners, using what we defined as a certainty
score, we found that the majority of VirusTotal scanners do not change the labels they
assign to apps over time. Nevertheless, the stability of such labels is not immune to future
change given the dynamicity of VirusTotal and its manipulation of scanners. Moreover,
stability of labels does not imply the correctness of those labels, as discussed in Section 4.3.
In addition to those insights that helped us identify the main limitations of VirusTotal,
the actionability of Maat is two-fold. Firstly, we showed that ML-based labeling strategies
trained by Maat using naive features consistently at accurately labeling apps based on
their VirusTotal scan reports than their threshold-based counterparts using the currently
optimal thresholds of VirusTotal scanners. In particular, we showed in Section 5.1, that the
performance of Maat’s ML-based labeling strategies maintain almost the same performance
over time, unlike their threshold-based counterparts that are sensitive to the dynamicity of
VirusTotal. Secondly, we found that Maat’s ML-based strategies contributed to training
ML-based detection methods, such as the Drebin classifier [4], that are more effective at
detecting out-of-sample Android malware. In summary, until VirusTotal’s limitations are
either addressed or new platforms are developed, we believe that Maat trains labeling
strategies that provide a viable alternative to unsustainable threshold-based strategies.
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